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Empirical studies on the determinants of divorce are scarce in economics. One
reason is the duality of the value of marriage, which combines economic gains for which
proxies can be found and non-pecuniary gains that are much harder to measure. The
literature on marital stability has therefore focused on the impact of income differentials
between partners, omitting shocks to the non-economic components of the value of the
marriage. We fill in the gap by extending the model of marriage dissolution to account
for a time-varying non-pecuniary quality of the match. To explore its importance, we
exploit a unique data set from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS)
which provides both labor market outcomes of the couples and subjective well-being
data. Our results suggest that the monetary and non-monetary components enter
the joint surplus additively, with gender-specific marginal rates of substitution. The
valuation of the monetary components also reveal gender asymmetry, which we link to
differences in remarriage prospects.
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A growing body of empirical literature has studied family formation and its close relationship
to fundamental questions of household and labor economics. These include the market and
domestic labor supply of spouses, their consumption of individual and public goods, transfers
between spouses and children, family welfare, and the intrahousehold allocation of resources
(Browning, Chiappori and Weiss 2014 offer a detailed and comprehensive overview of recent
advances in the field.) In contrast, Charles and Stephens (2004) point out the scarcity of
empirical studies on the determinants of marital dissolution and their links to household and
labor economics. Ten years later, this statement is still accurate, even though the theory of
marital stability and dissolution started with Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) (see Becker
1991 for a view of early contributions.)
The starting point of the divorce theory is a welfare analysis based on comparing individual
utilities from remaining married and from divorcing. Divorce occurs endogenously whenever
the former drops below the latter for one partner, possibly after reallocation of the surplus
within the couple. Utilities in marriage combine two components: an economic gain that
comes from public goods, risk-sharing, intertemporal consumption smoothing, and intra-
household transfers; and non-pecuniary gains pertaining to spouses' love, intensity of the
initial connection, complicity and companionship (Browning et al., 2014). Both components
may evolve over time in response to new information that married persons receive about
themselves and their partners.
Since the noneconomic benefits to marriage are problematic to measure, starting with Becker,
Landes and Michael (1977) empirical work has focused on the impact of income variations
on the probability of divorce using various sets of (mostly) US and UK data. Hoffman and
Duncan (1995) found weak effects of economic factors on the divorce hazard on 1968-87
PSID data. Weiss and Willis (1997) exploited panel data from the NLSY to study the
role of earning surprises (changes in long-run predictions of earnings at different periods
of marriage) in marital dissolution. Their results showed that predictions of earnings at
the time of marriage did not explain marriage patterns (conditional on education, religion
and ethnicity). However, unexpected changes in earnings were strong determinants of the
hazard of divorce. Using UK data (BHPS), Böheim and Ermisch (2001) found that couples
experiencing unexpected improvements in finances have lower dissolution risk, while couples
experiencing negative shocks are at higher risk.
Hess (2004) also used the NLSY; he concluded that divorce is more likely when income shocks
of the partners are positively correlated, and when one partner has a more volatile income
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process than the other. He also used a model of marriage to derive testable restrictions
in terms of spouses' income correlation and marriage duration. His tests suggest that the
non-pecuniary benefits to marriage are not a substitute to its economic benefits.
Other work has distinguished income- and wealth-related shocks by their nature. Charles
and Stephens (2004) explicitly model earning shocks as due to job loss or disability. Using
US data (PSID), they find that job displacement increases the divorce hazard, but disability
does not. They argue that this shows that divorce decisions are also driven by non-pecuniary
factors. Rainer and Smith (2010) use UK data (BHPS, 1991-2004) and study the impact
of housing price shocks. They find that the hazard of divorce increases after negative price
shocks, while positive shocks have little effect. The responses are quite heterogeneous: they
depend on homeowner/renter status as well as cohorts and couples at different levels of
income and mortgage debt. Battu, Brown and Costa-Gomes (2013) extend the exploration
of financial shocks on marriage dissolution. They confirm that negative financial shocks
make divorce more likely. On the other hand, a negative shock from non-labor income
has no impact, while a positive one increases the dissolution hazard. They do not find a
significant impact of housing price shocks.
This brief review shows that the literature exploring marital stability focused on the impact
of income differentials and shocks to earnings and wealth. Much less has been done to take
into account the non-economic components of the value of the marriage. Weiss and Willis
(1997) try to control for it using self-reported happiness during first five years of marriage.
Otherwise, the quality of match is usually modeled using fixed effects, which implies that the
value of marriage is time-invariant in terms of its non-pecuniary traits (for example Charles
and Stephens, 2004; Nunley and Seals, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, no empirical
work allows for shocks to the non-pecuniary quality of the match.
The happiness literature has studied the relationship between marital status and subjective
well-being (for example Gardner and Oswald, 2006; Lucas, Clark, Georgellis and Diener,
2003; Waite and Gallagher 2000). But its goal is to evaluate the effect of marital status
on the happiness of individuals, while we are interested in the reverse link. The majority
of the studies focus on comparing reported levels of subjective well-being across different
individuals. It reports a positive association between marriage and subjective well-being.
Economic demographers and psychologists relate this correlation to selection effects, social
roles effects, and adaptation. The selection hypothesis implies that happier people are more
outgoing and are more successful in finding a good match, while unhappy people are more
likely to have trouble finding a stable mate. The social role hypothesis implies that divorced
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individuals are less likely to have social networks and more likely to have financial difficulties.
Lucas et al. (2003) focus on the marriage of German couples and conclude that there is a
short-term relationship between one's changes in subjective well-being and marital status
transitions to married, divorced or widowed. To explain this, they put forward the idea of
adaptation, wherein subjective well-being reacts to events such as changes in marital status
but returns to baseline level of satisfaction. Within the discussion, Lucas et al.(2003) ignore
the gain from marriage and its evolution. Lastly, Bruze, Svarer and Weiss (2015) estimate
a dynamic model of marriage, divorce and remarriage using panel data on two cohorts of
Danish men and women, in which the marital surplus is identified from the probability of
divorce.
Among very few works relating subjective well-being to the probability of divorce are the
studies by Gardner and Oswald (2006), Lundberg (2012), and Guven, Senik and Holger
(2012). Using British data, Gardner and Oswald (2006) find that couples breaking up are
initially less happy than the norm in the population, and that they eventually experience
positive shocks in life satisfaction after divorce. Lundberg finds an impact of some person-
ality traits, such as emotional instability, extraversion, etc. on marital dissolution. Guven
et al. explore the impact of spouses' differences in subjective well-being on the probability
of divorce using German, British, and Australian data. These differences are shown to be
positively correlated with the divorce hazard. The authors interpret this finding as evi-
dence for an aversion to unequal intrahousehold distributions of well-being. They also run
a number of tests to provide empirical evidence against reverse causality  the hypothesis
that expectations of an impending break-up induce a happiness gap between spouses. More
specifically, they show that the happiness gap has a significant impact even in the first year
of marriage, and the correlation under question is unrelated to post-divorce perspectives.
Guven et al. (2012) document gender asymmetry: the effect of the well-being gap is driven
by unhappier women. They also find that it is larger among couples where women earn high
income and/or men are unemployed.
Once again, this literature does not allow for shocks to non-pecuniary benefits of marriage
over time. Moreover, the two strands of literature have not merged: one focuses on eco-
nomic benefits, the other does on non-pecuniary benefits. We fill in these two gaps using an
integrated framework in which gains from marriage have both monetary and non-monetary
time-varying components. To do this, we exploit a unique data set coming from the Russian
Longitudinal Monetary survey (RLMS), which provides detailed information on households
over the period of 19942013. In addition to standard information on demographic char-
acteristics and earnings of individuals, it contains subjective data on satisfaction with life.
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This allows us to link shocks to the subjective well-being (conditioned on other, economic
shocks) with the evolving quality of the match.
Our results suggest that monetary and non-monetary ingredients combine additively in joint
marital output. Non-monetary satisfaction impacts marital stability positively, and matters
more for women than for men. The results related to the monetary components reveal also
gender asymmetry, which can be explained by differences in probability of remarrying. They
call for a more dynamic view of matching and rematching.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the conceptual framework of marital
outcome, monetary and non-monetary components of the gain from marriage and spouses'
divorce decision. We describe how we use the ongoing annual panel Russia Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey (RLMS) in section 3. Section 4 analyzes the subjective self-reports. Sec-
tion 5 describes our empirical approach to the determinants of the divorce hazard. Section 6
presents the results.
2 Theoretical Background
A vast body of theoretical literature has been devoted to marriage formation and dissolution.1
The main conclusions can be summarized as follows.
Efficient divorce First and foremost, divorce typically is a joint decision that involves
renegociations and transfers. Even when unilateral, divorce does not necessarily happens
when one partner is no longer satisfied with the relationship; separation occurs only if all
possible renegotiations have been unsuccessfully explored, that is in the event of inachiavable
(re)allocation of resources within the household such that both spouses would find continu-
ation of marriage better than divorce. This intuition, initially introduced by Becker (1973,
1974), is central to our current understanding of the phenomenon. It implies that one may
think of divorce as an efficient phenomenon; divorce occurs when no renegotiated agreement
could make the continuation of marriage a valid alternative for both spouses. If for instance
a negative shock affects the non monetary component of the marital gain, divorce can be
seen as an opportunity to resample; it therefore has an option value (Chiappori and Weiss
2006, 2007).
1See Becker (1991) for an early survey, and Browning et al. (2014) for a more recent presentation.
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A specific version of this argument, emphasized by Becker (1973), further assumes that
utilities are transferable within the household, both while married and after divorce. To be
more precise, there exist cardinal representations of each spouse's preferences such that the
utility frontier is a straight line with slope −1, irrespective of prices and incomes. In practice,
this assumes that individuals can transfer utility between them at a constant exchange rate.
In this context, one can derive the well-known Becker-Coase theorem, which states that
laws governing divorce (mutual consent versus unilateral, as well as division of resources and
definition of alimony payments) cannot influence the divorce rate. However, the necessary
conditions for this conclusion to hold are strong and quite unlikely to hold in practice, as
argued by Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2015).
Non economic gains from marriage Secondly, the gain from marriage depends on
both economic and non economic components; shocks affecting any of these components
may trigger either renegotiation or divorce. Non monetary components of marital gain are
usually modeled as random factors drawn from some exogenous distribution, that enter
utility additively; as we shall see, this form fits our empirical findings quite well. Simple
as it may seem, such a setting allows for rich interactions between the various components;
for instance, a negative shock affecting the non economic component may or may not be
compensated by renegotiated utility transfers between spouses, depending on the magnitude
of economic gains.
Technically, part of the literature assumes that non economic effects can be summarized by
a single indicator which is common to both spouses. This is often called the quality of the
match. Other contributions introduce individual-specific shocks. The distinction is partly
related to different theoretical backgrounds; for instance, under transferable utility (TU),
individuals may value differently the non-monetary aspects of the relationship but only the
sum of their evaluations matters. Our data allow us to reconsider this issue from a novel
perspective. First, we show that individual evaluations, although correlated, do not coincide.
Second, and in sharp contrast with the predictions stemming from a TU model with additive
shocks, the impact of individual evaluations is not symmetric across genders. Our findings
therefore provide new insights into the issue.
Economic gains from marriage Economic gains from marriage can be classified into
two main categories. Some are related to the existence of economies of scale or public
consumptions, which a larger household obtains more efficiently. Many authors include
fertility within this category: to the extent that children's well-being enters both parents'
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utilities, they are indeed publicly consumed. Households can also be viewed as clubs
that alleviate some market incompleteness or failures. For instance, in the absence of a
complete set of financial markets, individuals within a household can share risk in a mutually
beneficial way. Similarly, coordinating labor supply may help cope with liquidity constraints
and restore efficient investments, particularly in human capital (one may think of the cliché
story of the wife working as a nurse while the husband studies medicine).
Clearly, analyzing the economic gains to marriage raises difficult issues, related in particular
to the notion of commitment. Risk sharing and coordinated savings obviously require the
ability to commit to some future behavior. Risk can be shared only if each spouse can commit
to transfer part of his or her income to a less-lucky partner; a nurse for instance would be
reluctant to fund her husband's training if she believed that he would leave her after his
graduation. It is fair to say that no agreement has been reached on the level of commitment
that can be assumed to exist; some theoretical models disregard the issue altogether by
assuming full commitment, while others postulate that agents renegotiate on a regular basis.
An increasingly popular framework, the Limited-commitment Intertemporal Collective (or
LIC) model2, adopts an intermediate view: contracts are assumed to be constrained efficient
given limits on individuals's ability to commit (e.g., under most legal regimes they cannot
commit not to divorce).
Commitment considerations have important implications regarding the consequences of mon-
etary shocks experienced by one of the spouses. Take for instance a decline in a spouse's
wage. Under full commitment, this should have no impact on divorce: spouses should fully
insure each other against such shocks, including large ones. In a LIC context, patterns are
more complex. Small shocks should indeed have no impact, since they will be smoothed
by risk sharing mechanisms within the household. There is however a limit to shocks that
can be absorbed by existing arrangements. In particular, the shock may be so large that
continuing with the initial agreement would violate individual rationality: one spouse at
least would become worse off remaining married than (s)he would be if divorced. In that
case, two outcomes are possible: either a renegotiation on intrahousehold allocation succeeds
in preserving the marital link, or no such agreement exists and the couple divorces. This
distinction between small shocks that should be insured away and large ones which may
trigger divorce is central to our empirical strategy.
Lastly, while marital gains depend in part on spouses' ability to commit, the opposite ef-
fect is also present. To the extent that marital gains involve investments from both parts,
2See Chiappori and Mazzocco (forthcoming) for a survey.
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they tend to increase the value of a maintained relationship, therefore increasing the level
of commitment available. A typical example is children. On the one hand, investing in
fertility and children's human capital is a long term decision, for which some minimal level
of commitment is needed. Conversely, such investments, once realized, increase the costs of
separation, therefore stabilizing the relationship. This intuition dates back to Becker et al.
(1977), who explain the stabilizing effect of children via their role as marital-specific capital.
By definition, marital-specific capital increases marital gains in the current marriage more
than outside utility. This drives down the probability of divorce. As we shall see, these
standard predictions are confirmed in our data.
Remarriage A third set of issues is related to remarriage. In evaluating the expected
utility after divorce, individuals take into account remarriage prospects: this is the option
value of divorce. This has several implications. First, it is hard to model divorce and
remarriage, and more generally the most important household decisions, without adopting an
equilibrium approach. Whether the issue is investment in education, choice of a geographical
location, or agreeing to divorce, the intra-household decision process indeed depends on the
spouses' outside options, which play an important role in the intrahousehold allocation of
resources and welfare. However, these outside options are themselves linked not only to the
probability of finding a new mate in case of divorce, but also to the allocation of welfare that
would prevail within the hypothetical new household; and that in turn is endogenous and
determined by similar mechanisms. In other words, intrahousehold allocation is intrinsically
an equilibrium phenomenon.
Allowing for remarriage also changes the theoretical analysis of the consequences of unex-
pected income shocks. Consider a positive and permanent shock that boosts expectations
about one of the spouses' future income. In principle, such a shock increases both marital
gain and the person's expected utility when single. However, most mechanisms that lie be-
hind the notion of marital gains, such as of public consumptions within households, have a
dual effect. First, they make the effect of positive income shocks larger within marriage than
when single, if only because this spouse now can spend part of the additional income on
goods and services that also benefit other family members. If divorce means remaining sin-
gle forever, positive income shocks therefore should decrease divorce probabilities. But the
mechanisms that underlie marital gains also tend to imply positive assortative matching on
income  and most data sets, including ours, strongly support such predictions. Remarriage
introduces the possibility of rematching up to a higher income partner; and re-entering
the marriage market in a better economic position may result in a new and better match,
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inflating the value of additional income outside the current marriage. If the probability of
remarriage is high enough, large positive income shocks will make divorce more likely. Note,
finally, that remarriage probabilities typically differ across genders; men remarry more fre-
quently than women. While an explanation for this difference is beyond the scope of this
paper, we should expect the impact of economic shocks on divorce probabilities to depend
on the gender of the spouse who is hit by the shock.
3 Data
The data we use are drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). This
is an annual panel data based on nationally representative surveys designed to monitor the
effects of Russian reforms on the health and economic welfare of households and individuals
in the Russian Federation. It is jointly conducted by the Carolina Population Center at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (USA) and the Demoscope team of the High
School of Economics (Russia).
Our study is based on rounds 6-22 of the survey, from the period 1995-2013. These rounds
have all been published. At each round, the RLMS interview was completed with the house-
hold members in the original sample dwelling unit. The RLMS is thus a longitudinal study
of population dwelling units. The target sample size was set at 4000 households. In 2010
the sample was augmented by 2000 households.
The survey is made up of household and individual questionnaires3. The household part
of the survey provides information on household structure, living conditions, expenditures,
and incomes. The individual part of the survey covers in detail marital status, employment,
education and health. Moreover, the individual questionnaire contains a number of questions
pertaining to subjective welfare and beliefs regarding political and economic issues.
Our sample consists of married couples living together or breaking up over the course of our
panel. We only kept couples whose two partners had non-missing values of the demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics thought to influence the divorce hazard and subjective
data. This allows us to predict the non-monetary component of the marriage output. Since
we are studying the transition from married to divorced status of individuals, we also need
information from at least two consecutive periods of time. This gives us a working sample of
3There are also child and community-level questionnaires. The latter provides information on region-
specific prices and community infrastructure.
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5,346 couples. 20% of these couples are observed only twice over the course of the 1995-2013
period. The frequencies of longer spells decay progressively, from about 19% for couples
observed over a three-year period to 2% for couples observed over 10 to 15 years.
Table A.1 in the Appendix provides some basic descriptive statistics about the sample. Men
are two years older than women; spouses' education attainments are similar, but men earn
about 30% more than women. The table also reports the distribution of the subjective data
we will use at different stages of our empirical analysis.
3.1 Assortative Matching
The data fit our assumption of positive assortative matching on income: spouses' wages
are positively correlated. The last five rounds we use (rounds 18-22 of the RLMS) provide
information on the duration of marriage among the observable couples and thus allow us
to evaluate the correlation between wages at different levels of duration. Table A.2 in the
Appendix reports estimates of a linear regression relating wife's wage to husband's wage,
controlling for her age and education and taking into account random effects. Different
thresholds for duration (3, 5, 9, 14, 19, 24, 30, 34 and 42 years) correspond to the deciles
of marriage duration in the sample. As can be seen from the table, the correlation decays
slowly with the duration of marriage but it is always positive. Its value is slightly lower than
in the US for instance, where Browning et al.(2014) report 0.4 correlation between spouses'
wages. They attribute the positive sorting to reduced specialization within US couples: an
increase in female labor supply over recent decades and technological advance discouraged
traditional division of labor exploiting comparative advantages by allocating wives's labor
to the household production and husbands' labor to the market activity; in the traditional
framework, specialization of spouses' labor maximized the marital output and yielded the
highest gain under a negative correlation between their wages (Becker, 1973).
3.2 Divorce and remarriage
In the US and Western Europe, the divorce rate doubled from the mid-1960s to the mid-1985,
reaching an annual population rate of 3-5 depending on the country. Since then it has
had country-specific fluctuations with no clear trend (Browning et al., 2014). The divorce
rate in Russia has followed roughly the same trajectory. As illustrated by Figure 1, since
the 1990s and in particular over the period of study, the Russian divorce rate has fluctuated,
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with a strong peak in 2000 and a moderate peak in 20094. These fluctuations do not have
an obvious cause since the divorce legislation did not change in the 1990s (Population of
Russia, 2014). According to the Russian population census of 2010-2011, the annual divorce
rate among married couples is 22. The RLMS data exhibits the same rate (Table 1). Over
the course of our panel, 21% of couples broke up.
Figure 1: Sample divorce and remarriage rates among married couples, %
Source: RLMS, 1995-2013
Russian population, 2010-2011
Annual divorce rate among married couples 22
RLMS panel
Annual divorce rate among adults, 2010 15
Annual divorce rate among married couples, 2010 22
Sample in use
Divorce transition occurrences 974 (6.2%)
Number of couples 5346
Period of observation, mean 4
Period of observation, standard deviation 3
Fraction of couples broken up over the course of the panel 18%
Number of observations 15843
Table 1: Divorce rates
The dashed line of Figure 1 shows that divorces have often been followed with second mar-
riages since the 2000s. It is common to observe a higher marital turnover accompanying a
higher divorce rate; a larger number of divorcees increases remarriage probability, stimulat-
ing further divorces and remarriages (Browning et al., 2014). Figure 2 shows the share of
4Note that the reference rate here if the rate among married couples, which is roughly three times the
rate among the adult population.
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second marriages in all marriages during 1995-2011. A higher remarriage rate among men as
reported by the Russian Federal State Statistics Service data (the left-side graph) is also a
common finding; it can be explained by the larger proportion of divorced and widowed women
at older ages, the traditional age difference between spouses, and male earnings increasing
more than female earnings over the lifecycle. The right-side graph based on the RLMS data
displays similar time trends while do not show gender gap. This might be explained by the
fact that the RLMS survey do not attempt to follow up with divorced individuals who leave
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Figure 2: Share of second marriages
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service (left panel) and RLMS (right panel)
4 Quality of marriage as a component of life satisfaction
We use subjective well-being data to evaluate each spouses' perception of the quality of
match. Subjective well-being is addressed in the individual questionnaire of the survey,
where each individual is asked to rank their satisfaction with life using a 5-level scale where
1 corresponds to the highest level of satisfaction.
The happiness literature shows that marriage is one of several aspects of the satisfaction with
life reported by individuals. Among other factors are satisfaction with economic conditions,
employment, and health (see for example Van Praag, 2007; Kalugina, Radchenko and Sofer,
2009a, b; Radchenko, 2015). We employ various subjective reports from this section of RLMS
to explore variations in individuals' levels of satisfaction and their relationship with various
aspects of their life. Additional subjective information is conveyed through individuals' self-
ranking among the poor and rich, on a scale ranging from 1, the poorest, to 9, the richest.
The survey also reports individuals' ranking of their health status, ranging from 1 (very
12
good) to 5 (very bad). Moreover, rounds 9-22 (1998-2013) provide self-reported satisfaction
with economic conditions, evaluated over the same 5-level scale as the scale of satisfaction
with life. Rounds 11-22 (2002-2013) also report information on job satisfaction as well as
satisfaction with job conditions, payment and career growth opportunities5. In what follows,
the health status and all the satisfaction variables are recoded to follow conventional scale
where the lowest (highest) value corresponds to the lowest (highest) level of satisfaction or
health evaluation.
Finally, round 11 provides information on various aspects of the relationship within couples,
from bonds and caring to displeasure. Positive reports on the attitude of one's partner are
obtained from answers to questions including agreement and support, caring, advising, lis-
tening, making confident, understanding the way of thinking, and helping. On the negative
side, there are answers to the questions focusing on his or her aggressive behavior, compli-
cating one's life, showing displeasure, lack of desire for a sexual relationship, criticizing, and
offending. The answers are given at a scale describing frequencies of different behavioral
occurrences: 1 (never); 2 (sometimes); 3 (always).
Answers related to a positive attitude of the partner are highly positively correlated (about
0.5 correlation), as are answers referring to the negative attitude. We will focus on the posi-
tive and the negative questions whose answers have the highest rate of responses: supportive
behavior, and behavior showing displeasure. The first two columns of Table 2 show the cor-
relations between satisfaction with life and satisfaction with economic conditions (column 1)
or economic ranking (column 2) as well as with partnership quality and health ranking.
The correlations result from linear regressions based on round 11 (2002), which provided
information on partnership quality. Regressors are strongly correlated with satisfaction with
life. This shows that economic satisfaction, health, and partnership quality are indeed the
traits of the overall satisfaction with life. The last column of Table 2 shows that satisfaction
with economic conditions captures variations in one's wage and satisfaction with the job
payment. The estimates correspond to a fixed-effects linear regression run over rounds 11-22
(2002-2013), which provided information on economic satisfaction.
Overall, the data support the main findings reported in the literature on the components of
satisfaction. When running the empirical analysis, we will purge the reported match qualities
from variations due to economic conditions and health; section 5.1.2 provides more details.
5Individual evaluations are again given on a scale ranging from 1, the highest level of satisfaction, to 5.
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Satisfactiona) Satisfactiona) Satisfaction with
economic conditionsa)




Spouse's supportc) .209 .253∗∗∗
(.022) (.024)
Spouse's displeasurec) -.099∗∗∗ -.128∗∗∗
(.025) (.027)




Spouse's wage (ln) .028∗∗
(.012)
Satisfaction with joba) .062∗∗∗
(.009)
Satisfaction with job paymenta) .218∗∗∗
(.007)
Spouse's satisfaction with job paymenta) .079∗∗∗
(.006)
Satisfaction with work conditionsa) -.014∗
(.009)
Satisfaction with professional opportunitiesa) .031∗∗∗
(.007)
Constant 0.599∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 2.98∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.103) (.073)
N 6095 6075 29706
adj. R2 0.360 0.171 0.256
a) 1: not at all satisfied;. . . 5: strongly satisfied
b) 1: poor;. . . 9: rich
c) 1: never; 2: sometimes; 3: always
d) 1: very bad; . . . 5: very good
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Table 2: Correlation between satisfaction levels and various aspects
5 Empirical model
The empirical analysis consists of two stages. First, we construct monetary and non-
monetary shocks as residuals of wage and satisfaction regressions. Second, we estimate
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the divorce hazard model using the predictions from the first stage.
5.1 Monetary and non-monetary shocks
5.1.1 Wage equations
We define idiosyncratic monetary shocks as the residuals of the following fixed effects linear
regressions:
Wjti = γjXjti + pijt + uji + wjti (1)
where j = m, f is the gender of an individual observed in couple i at time t, and Wjti is the
logarithm of the hourly wage.
We follow Lacroix and Radchenko (2011) in specifying different wage equations for men and
women. Xjti is a vector of individual wage determinants (education, age, age squared). The
fixed effects pijt stand for a macroeconomic shock at time period t, and the fixed effects uji
capture unobservable time invariant wage determinants. Finally, wjti represents idiosyncratic
wage shocks at time period t.
The unobserved heterogeneity factors umi and ufi relate to time-invariant labor market
situations of man and woman in household i, and to unobserved personal characteristics
that impact individual wages. umi and ufi may be correlated through positive assortative
matching of spouses. umi and ufi may also capture permanent shocks on the value of
human capital6.
The expected wage rate implied by (1) is defined as
Wˆjti = γˆjXjti + uˆji. (2)
Note that we choose not to consider aggregate wage shocks (pijt) as monetary shocks impact-
ing divorce hazard. The reason is that these shocks do not vary across individuals of a given
gender. As such, they should mostly shift the distribution of wages within couples, with-
out impacting relative earning abilities within the respective gender groups. Given positive
6We attempted to estimate more complex wage equations with highly persistent shock (modeled by a
random walk) or serially correlated temporary shocks. Unfortunately, the panel dimension does not seem to
be strong enough to identify such structures.
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assortative matching based on incomes, the aggregate shocks would not impact remarriage
prospects and the divorce hazard7.
5.1.2 Quality of matching
In our model of divorce, we took the evolution of match qualities θ = (θf (m), θm(f))
to be exogenous. It reflects the evolution of partners' relationship and the intensity of
their connection. The model does not explicitly allow θ to change in anticipation of the
post-divorce utility. However, the restriction does not induce an endogeneity bias in our
estimates of θ. Suppose for instance that the wife fears a unilateral divorce. In such a
case, an exogenous drop in her husband's perception of the quality of the marriage might
cause her θf to decrease. But this is simply a correlation between the two components of
θ; our theoretical model allows for it, and we explicitly address it in the empirical model by
allowing θf (m) and θm(f) to be correlated.
The residual values representing the evolution of θ are obtained by estimating the following
system:
satliffti = α11satlifmti + α12sateconfti + α13healthfti +
+ α14Wfti + α15Wmti + α16agefti + τft + θfti
(3)
satlifmti = α21satliffti + α22sateconmti + α23healthmti +
+ α24Wmti + α25Wmti + α26agemti + τmt + θmti.
Here f and m stand for women and men respectively; i and t are, as previously, couple and
time subscripts. satlife and satecon stand for variables representing satisfaction with life and
self-rating among rich and poor respectively; health represents subjective health evaluation;
τft and τmt are time fixed effects.
This stage of the empirical analysis omits individual fixed effects that might be related to
such individual characteristics as pessimism or optimism. However, not controlling for the
7They can affect the divorce hazard via the probability of singlehood. However, the wage rate increased
over the whole period, and the time dummies are likely to also reflect the effects of inflation despite the CPI
used to adjust the nominal wages.
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fixed effects is not as restrictive as it might seem at first glance. Indeed, the regression
includes satisfaction with economic conditions and health as explanatory variables. These
variables are subjective indicators as well; the correlation between satlif and these variables
is partly due to the common fixed effects related to individual perceptions. Controlling for
these variables filters the variations that are due to satisfaction with economic conditions
and health, but also provides a control for fixed effects related to individual subjectivity.
5.2 Divorce equation
Our empirical model of divorce defines the probability of transition from married to divorced
status of the partners8:
P (Dt+1,i = 1|Dt,i = 0) = Φ
(
Sti + βmθˆmti + βf θˆfti + βXXti + λt + di
)
(4)
where Φ stands for the standard normal cdf and Dt,i is a dummy variable that equals one
if the individual reports being divorced at date t and zero otherwise. Since the divorce
procedure takes up to several months with the minimum pace of one month, the decision
to divorce by year (t + 1) is assumed to be taken in year t based on the corresponding
information set It.
In line with the conceptual setting, the divorce hazard depends on both monetary and
non-monetary shocks. These two main components of the information set are Sti, which
represents the economic surplus for couple i at time t, and (θˆmti, θˆfti) which represent the
non-monetary shocks to the match quality of the couple and are calculated as residuals of
system (3). In addition to the expected wage rates of the spouses at time t defined by (2),




jti standing for the strong





ti corresponding to the indicators of unemployment
episodes experienced by time t by one of the spouses, woman or man, and both spouses
respectively. The Sti component is allowed to be non-monotonic in the wage shocks defined
as residuals of (1):
8Unfortunately, most rounds of the survey do not provide data on marriage duration. This makes it
impossible to use a duration model of the divorce hazard. However, the duration of marriage is highly
correlated with age, which we include on Xti (estimation based on the few rounds that have information on
marriage duration show that the correlation with age is 0.9).
9The specification using the tail terms is motivated by our analysis of the distributions of the wage
components obtained from (1), which we discuss in section 6.
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wq10jti = min(wjti − qwj ,10, 0)
wq90jti = max(wjti − qwj ,90, 0)
with qwj ,10 and qwj ,90 denoting the 10th and 90th percentiles of the wj distribution
10. This
allows for some nonlinearity in the dependence of the divorce probability on wage shocks.
Finally, Xti and di are couple-level observable and unobservable heterogeneity. They contain
the couple's demographic and human capital characteristics, as well as unobserved charac-
teristics impacting the marriage stability of couple i. We also allow for regional differences
and for time fixed effects λt.
6 Results
6.1 Wage equations
Table 3 shows fixed effects estimates of the wage equations (1) for men and women. The
equations are estimated using a sample of working individuals which is considerably larger
than our main sample based on a selection of the rounds providing the necessary informa-
tion. Using this extended sample allows us to obtain precise and efficient estimates of wage
determinants while including a rich set of fixed effects. As expected, wages are positively
correlated with age, years of education, and experience11. Figure 3, which shows univariate
10The 10th and 90th percentiles of the log-wage shock distributions are roughly −0.5 and 0.5 for both
gender groups, so that our strong shocks are larger than approximately 50% in absolute value.
11The return to human capital is stable over the observational window. The parsimonious model reported
excludes interactions between human capital variables and time.
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distributions of male and female wage shocks among divorcees and among women and men
remaining married, suggests that the divorce probability is sensitive to strong positive or
negative male shocks but is insensitive in regards to female shocks. Figure 4 illustrates the
joint distribution of spouses' shocks.
Figure 5 depicts the distributions of the expected wage rates wˆmti and wˆfti among divorcees
and among married men and women. Perhaps surprisingly, the distribution of female ex-
pected wage rates shows that divorced women tend to earn higher wages than married women.
Figure 6 clarifies the issue by showing that the difference between wife's and husband's ex-
pected wage rates for couples that divorce is also to the right of that for couples that stay
married. Thus, the wage estimates suggest that couples in which women earn higher wages
than their spouses dissolve more frequently, as compared to the couples in which women
earn lower wages.
Wife's wage (ln) Husband's wage (ln)
Age .029∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(.011) (.011)
Age squared -.0005∗∗∗ -.0006∗∗∗
(.000) (.000)




Fraction of residuals variance
related to the time-invariant component 0.66 0.61
N 50279 44516
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Table 3: Spouses' wage equations (fixed effects estimates)
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Figure 3: Distribution of the wage shocks.
Figure 4: Bivariate distribution of the wage shocks.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the expected wage rates
Figure 6: Distribution of the differences between female and male expected wage rates (left
panel) and unobserved heterogeneity (right panel)
6.2 Perceived match qualities
We estimate system (3) by three-stage least-squares method using an extended sample of
couples with the necessary information. Table 4 reports our estimates. Wives' and hus-
bands' levels of satisfaction are positively correlated. Higher wages of both spouses yield
higher levels of each partner's satisfaction. Spouses' economic and health ranking are also
positively correlated with their satisfaction. Time effects (not reported) are similar among
the spouses, with stronger amplitude for women than for men. A large decrease in satisfac-
tion is associated with the period of 1996-2000. This is in line with results of Kalugina et al.
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(2009b) that register a significant negative impact of the economic crisis of 1998 on spouses'
subjective well-being. A similar effect occurs in the 2008 recession.
Figure 7 shows that the distributions of θˆft and θˆmt for married individuals dominate those
of divorcees. This provides our first empirical evidence of a negative relationship between
divorce hazard and the quality of matches.
Wife's satisfactiona) Husband's satisfactiona)
Spouse's satisfactiona) .278∗∗∗ .287∗∗∗
(.024) (0.026)
Own wage (ln) .115∗∗∗ .068∗∗∗
(.000) (.009)
Spouse's wage (ln) .046∗∗∗ .047∗∗∗
(.009) (.010)
Economic rankb) .155∗∗∗ .166∗∗∗
(.006) (.006)









a) 1: not at all satisfied;...5: strongly satisfied
b) 1: poor;. . . 9: rich
c) 1: very bad; . . . 5: very good
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Table 4: Spouses' satisfaction (3SLS estimates)
22
Figure 7: Distribution of the θ shocks
6.3 Divorce
We estimate divorce model (4) using a random effects probit regression. Table 5 reports the
estimates. To interpret them, recall that the higher θ is, the higher the non-monetary benefit
of marriage. In line with our conceptual framework, the model estimates show that both
monetary and non-monetary factors influence the likelihood of divorce. More interestingly,
we could not find any significant impact of the interaction terms constructed as products of
(θf , θm) and wage-related variables: a likelihood-ratio test does not reject the null hypothesis
of joint irrelevance of the interacted terms (the corresponding test statistic is 13.3 and the
5%-critical value of a χ2(8) is 15.5)12. This result validates the assumption that the monetary
and non-monetary ingredients enter the marital output additively.
Again in line with the theoretical background, we found that the probability of divorce was
insensitive to the small shocks: the estimates corresponding to the central parts of the
wage distribution qwjti,10 < wjti < qwjti,90 are small and statistically insignificant (see A.3 in
Appendix). We excluded them from the regression whose results are in Table 5.
We also observe a significantly negative relationship between the likelihood of divorce and
the number of children and educational achievements. These are classical findings; they were
reported in the literature using US data (Becker et al., 1977; van der Klaauw, 1996; Weiss and
Willis, 1997). Becker et al. explain the stabilizing effect of children via their interpretation
as marital-specific capital. By definition, marital-specific capital increases marital gains in
the current marriage more than outside utility. This drives down the probability of divorce.
12The corresponding specification is not reported but is available on request.
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Monetary determinants Non monetary determinants
Husband's strong positive wage shocka) .300∗ Wife's θc) -.214∗∗∗
(.184) (.037)
Husband's strong negative wage shockb) .473∗∗ Husband's θ -.063∗
(.212) (.036)
Wife's strong positive wage shocka) -.213 Husband's years of education -.037∗∗
(.214) (.018)
Wife's strong negative wage shockb) .098 Wife's minus husband's education .016
(.245) (.012)
Wife's strong positive wage shock -.864
×husband's strong positive wage shock (.896) Husband's age -.001
Wife's strong negative wage shock 1.657∗∗ (.004)
×husband's strong negative wage shock (.825) Wife's minus husband's age -.013
Wife's unemployment episode .281∗∗ (.009)
(.141)
Husband's unemployment episode .063 Number of children -.068∗
(.116) (.041)
Joint unemployment episodes .757∗∗∗
(.187)
Expected wife's wage .315∗∗∗ Regional dummies Yes
(.085)
Expected husband's wage -.095 Year dummies Yes
(.085)
Within group correlation .774∗∗∗ Constant -3.44∗∗∗
(.016) (.552)
N 15843
a) 10% right tail
b) 10% left tail
c) θ corresponds to the theoretical θ: the higher one's θ, the higher one's benefit to marriage
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Table 5: Transitions to divorce status (random effects probit estimates)
Reported match quality has a negative impact on marital dissolution: the higher the sat-
isfaction of the spouses, the lower the divorce probability. The effect is much stronger for
women: the estimate associated with the female perception of the match quality is about
three times larger than the estimate associated with the male perception.
In terms of monetary impacts, the results are specific relative to different economic com-
ponents included as explanatory variables. The graphs of the wage shocks distributions
(Figures 3 and 4) imply that marital stability is especially sensitive to shocks corresponding
to the upper and lower 10% tails of the distribution. In particular, the distribution of shocks
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among divorced men has fatter tails than the distribution of the shocks among men who
stay married. This is intuitive, given that our wage shocks are residuals that are one-period
lagged relative to the divorce status transition. The shocks represent therefore transitory
and/or recent changes; only strong shocks of this kinds are likely to destabilize couples in
the short run. The model estimates are in line with the graphical analysis and imply that
the divorce likelihood is insensitive to the small shocks13: the estimates corresponding to
the central parts of the wage distribution are weak and statistically insignificant (see A.3
in Appendix). This is also in line with the theoretical background implying that even un-
der limited commitment the small shocks are smoothed out by intrahousehold risk sharing.
The asymmetry between genders  with male shocks being apparently more important 
is compatible with the higher remarriage rate among men reported by the Russian Federal
State Statistics Service data (section 3.2). Such an explanation is also consistent with the
theoretical background discussed earlier.
Further, the estimates of the divorce model follow the descriptive graphs and the theoretical
background by reporting a positive correlation between strong male wage shocks and divorce.
In line with the the theoretical prediction discussed in Section 2, positive shocks raise the
attractiveness of remarriage, since assortative matching implies that a new spouse would
typically be 'better' than the current one; if remarriage probability is large enough, this may
trigger divorce.
Divorce is especially likely when the spouses are hit by shocks of opposite sign. From an in-
surance viewpoint, these are easier to cover: insofar as the shocks are of similar magnitudes,
so that the impact on aggregate income is feeble, the mutuality principle predicts that inter-
nal insurance should compensate them out. However, commitment problems are especially
severe in this case, particularly when remarriage is easy. Indeed, Figure 8 illustrates how
shocks that hit the two partners in opposite ways create a mismatch and increase the prob-
ability of divorce. When shocks increase the mismatch between spouses to the detriment
of the wife (with a strong positive male shock and a negative female shock), the divorce
probability doubles, up to 3%14. These effects of opposite-sign strong shocks are statistically
significant, except for very strong shocks which are rarely observed in the data.
As predicted by theory, the disruptive effect of a positive male shock could be counter-
balanced by positive changes in the non-economic quality of match θ. Our results indeed
show that higher spouses' satisfaction reduces the divorce probability. This effect is gender-
specific, however: the estimate associated with the female perception of the match quality is
13Excluded from the parsimonious estimation reported in Table 5
14The annual divorce rate is 2.2% according to both census and RLMS data for 2010.
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about three times higher than the estimate associated with the male perception of the match
quality. Figure 9 shows the predicted divorce probability at different levels of the male sat-
isfaction scale and wage shock. Depending on the magnitude of the shock, the probability
goes from 1% to 4% at the highest level of θm and from 2% to 6% at its lowest level.
The positive effect of a male wage shock on the probability of divorce obviously implies that
a negative male wage shock reduces the likelihood of divorce. This is an unexpected result.
As discussed in section 2, negative shocks to the husband's wage reduce the marital economic
gain and should increase the probability that the wife will want a divorce in order to find
a better match. The theory implies that a larger deviation between actual and expected
wages should make divorce more likely, independently of the direction of the shock. In
contrast, our estimates suggest that couples reallocate utility in the short run in order to
stay married. This could be due to a low remarriage probability for the woman in the short
run, and to longer-term considerations underlying her perspectives as single. Once again,
such an explanation is consistent with the higher remarriage rate among men reported by
the Russian Federal State Statistics Service data (section 3.2).
When both spouses experience strong unexpected negative shocks, it becomes impossible to
reallocate utility so as to keep the marriage stable. The positive estimate of the effect of the
product of the strong negative shocks of the spouses (10% lower tails of female and male
wage shocks) confirms this; but the estimate is only weakly significant (10% significance
level). The corresponding probability predictions are statistically significant for midsized
negative shocks, beyond which observations are too scarce. The estimates associated with
unemployment episodes provide more evidence on marital dissolution following unexpected
negative shocks experienced by both spouses. Such episodes increase the divorce probability.
The marginal effect of the wife's unemployment is weaker than the husband's. The effect is
particularly strong if both spouses have been unemployed for some time within the period
of observation. These disruptive effects of negative job shocks agree with empirical findings
reported in the literature using US and UK data (Battu et al., 2013; Böheim and Ermisch,
2001; Charles and Stephens, 2004; Hess, 2004).
We saw that the marital payoff was sensitive to wage shocks that benefit the husband.
Results on the effect of expected wages reveal another gender asymmetry, which goes in
the opposite direction. The divorce probability ranges from 0 to 2% when female expected
wages are low, but it increases to up to 8% at their high levels (Figure 10). Moreover, the
corresponding marginal effect also increases with the wife's expected wage. This confirms a
common finding of the literature using US data: Becker et al. (1977), van der Klaauw (1996)
and Weiss and Willis (1997) also found disruptive effects of higher female earnings.
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One can go further and assert that couples in which the wife's expected wage is larger than
the husband's are more likely to divorce. The descriptive graphs shown on Figure 5 already
suggest it, and the estimates of the divorce model confirm and specify this effect: Figure 10
shows that the divorce likelihood is high in the area above the main diagonal, and increases
with the difference in wages. This finding mirrors to some extent the relationship between the
male wage shock and divorce probability. The disruptive effect of a higher female wage may
be compensated by a high non-economic quality of match θ. Figure 11 quantifies the effects
at different levels of woman's wage and θf . Depending on the wage level, the probability is
no stronger than 2% at the highest level of θf and runs up to 12% at its lowest level. For
high female wages, the variation in θf moves the divorce probability by up to 10 points. The
marginal effect is stronger at lower levels of the wife's perceived match quality and when the
husband has an unfavorable wage shock.
Such patterns might be explained by traditional gender norms within the couples where the
man is the main breadwinner  see Becker et al. (1977) and Weiss and Willis (1997)15. Note,
however, that these US findings are based on 1970s data. The context has changed since
then: the turnover on the marriage market is considerably higher, and female labor-force
participation is much stronger in Western countries (Browning et al., 2014) and high in
Russia (see section 3.2 and Population of Russia, 2014). Early studies reported negative
assortative matching on wages (conditional on educations) and attributed it to a high degree
of specialization within the couples. More recent estimates find positive assortative match-
ing on spouses' wages, both on US data (Browning et al., 2014) and in the RLMS survey
(see section 3.2). In this new context, the disruptive effect of a higher wife-husband wage
ratio may simply imply that such women chose their first husbands suboptimally and then
reoptimize. Gender asymmetry in the initial matching would follow from a higher search
cost for women: with preferences for children, waiting for a better match is more costly for
women than for men since their reproductive time horizon is shorter (Low, 2014). Premarital
childbearing can also increase women's search cost (Becker et al., 1977), making them more
likely to accept a mismatch. There may also be additional explanations specific to Russia.
There is evidence that the Russian society still values a patriarchal model of the family, with
earlier marriages for women as well as earlier childbearing (Blum et al., 2009). This would
act to increase the women's waiting cost further.
Finally, figures 11 and 9 show that θf and θm are not perfect substitutes in marital output.
The slope of the probability isoquant corresponding to the women's graph is roughly twice
as high as the slope corresponding to the men's graph (0.68 versus 0.33). This suggests
15We should note her that Weiss and Willis measure predicted earnings somewhat differently.
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that divorce is more sensitive to the non-pecuniary dissatisfaction of the wife than to the
husband's.
Concluding remarks
Our results are in line with the predictions of our theoretical background framework. Both
monetary and non-monetary components of the marital output predict divorce. Moreover,
they seem to combine additively in marital output. Higher subjective levels of match quality
predict marriage stability. This effect is much stronger for women than for men: the marginal
rate of substitution between monetary and non-monetary marital payoff is twice higher for
Russian women than it is for Russian men.
The impacts of economic determinants are more complex. Higher wages for both spouses tend
to reduce the divorce hazard. However, the mechanisms triggering divorce are gender-specific;
the economic components destabilizing the marriage are of a different nature. We explained
this in terms of men having a higher remarriage probability in the short run than women.
Our investigation of the effects of expected wages also shows that high wife to husband wage
ratios disrupt marriage. The finding is common in the literature; it has traditionally been
attributed to the division of labor between the spouses, whereby wives take a larger part in
household production while husbands invest into the labor market activity. This may be less
relevant in 2010 than it was in 1980. The turnover on the marriage market is now higher; so
is female labor-force participation, and matching has become more positively assortative on
on wages. It may simply be that women have a higher search cost on the marriage market,
and therefore are more likely to match suboptimally at first and reoptimize later.
Overall, our findings describe the complex pattern of an evolving marriage market. They
call for a dynamic framework allowing for frictions of the matching process on the marriage
market. The RLMS data represent an excellent basis for further research in this direction
since the Russian population is characterized by numerous demographic shocks experienced
by various cohorts that can be exploited for identifying the matching patterns.
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Figure 8: Divorce probability at different levels of spouses' wage shocks
Figure 9: Divorce probability at different levels of husband's match quality and wage shock
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Figure 10: Divorce probability at different levels of spouses expected wage rates
Figure 11: Divorce probability at different levels of woman's match quality and wage
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A Appendix
Wives Husbands Divorceda) Women Divorceda) Men
Individual characteristics
Age 41 43 37 41
(10) (10) (9) (9)
Number of children 1.2 1.2 1.4 1
(0.8) (0.8) (0.9) (0.9)
Years of education 13 13 13 12
(3) (3) (3) (2)
Wage (ln) 3.7 4 4.2 4.5
(1.4) (1.4) (1.2) (1.1)
Subjective data
Satisfaction with lifeb) 3 3 3 3
(1) (1) (1) (1)
Satisfaction with economic conditionsb) 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.8
(1) (1) (1) (1)
Economic rankc) 4 4 4 4
(1.3) (1.3) (1) (1.4)
Health evaluationd) 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.7
Region of residence
Moscow - St-Petersburg 0.10 0.11
North / Northeastern 0.06 0.08
Central / Black sea 0.22 0.23
Volga / Viatsk / Volga basin 0.20 0.20
North Caucus 0.11 0.14
Ural 0.18 0.14
Western Siberia 0.06 0.04
Eastern Siberia 0.07 0.06
a) Divorced here denotes those who divorced over the course of the panel
b) 1:strongly satisfied;. . . 5: not at all satisfied
c) 1: poor;. . . 9: rich
d) 1: very good; . . . 5: very bad
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics on the key variables
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Covariate Estimate
<3 years marriage duration ×husband's wage (ln) .232∗∗∗
(.014)
3-4 years marriage duration ×husband's wage (ln) .222∗∗∗
(.013)
5-8 year marriage duration ×husband's wage (ln) .215∗∗∗
(.013)
9-13 year marriage duration ×husband's wage (ln) .215∗∗∗
(.012)
14-18 year marriage duration ×husband's wage (ln) .203∗∗∗
(.012)
19-23 year marriage duration ×husband's wage (ln) .198∗∗∗
(.012)
24-29 year marriage duration ×husband's wage (ln) .184∗∗∗
(.013)
30-34 year marriage duration ×husband's wage (ln) .175∗∗∗
(.014)











Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Table A.2: Assortative matching: regressing log female wages
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Monetary determinants Non monetary determinants
Husband's wage shock -.056 Wife's θc) -.214∗∗∗
(.107) (.037)
Husband's strong positive wage shocka) .399 Husband's θ -.062∗
(.262) (.036)
Husband's strong negative wage shockb) .573∗∗
(.285) Husband's years of education -.037∗∗
Wife's wage shock .013 (.018)
(.111) Wife's minus husband's education .016
Wife's strong positive wage shocka) -.233 (.012)
(.289)
Wife's strong negative wage shockb) .078 Husband's age -.001
(.321) (.004)
Wife's strong positive wage shock -.869 Wife's minus husband's age -.013
×husband's strong positive wage shock (.892) (.009)
Wife's strong negative wage shock 1.666∗∗
×husband's strong negative wage shock (.827) Number of children -.068∗
Wife's unemployment episode .282∗∗ (.041)
(.141)
Husband's unemployment episode .062
(.116)
Joint unemployment episodes .756∗∗∗
(.188)
Expected wife's wage .316∗∗∗ Regional dummies Yes
(.086)
Expected husband's wage -.096 Year dummies Yes
(.085)
Within group correlation .774∗∗∗ Constant -3.44∗∗∗
(.016) (.552)
N 15843
a) 10% right tail
b) 10% left tail
c) θ corresponds to the theoretical θ: the higher one's θ, the higher one's benefit to marriage
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Table A.3: Transitions to divorce status (random effects probit estimates)
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